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Estimating the Efﬁciency of Voting in Big Size
Committees
Pavel Doleˇ zel
Abstract In a simple voting committee with a ﬁnite number of members, in which each member
has a voting weight, the voting rule is deﬁned by the quota (a minimal number of voting weights
is required to approve a proposal), and the efﬁciency of voting in the committee is deﬁned as
the ratio of the number of winning coalitions (subsets of the set of members with total voting
weights no less than the quota) to the number of all possible coalitions. A straightforward way
of calculating the efﬁciency is based on the full enumeration of all coalitions and testing whether
or not they are winning. The enumeration of all coalitions is NP-complete problem (the time
required to ﬁnd the solution grows exponentially with the size of the committee) and is unusable
for big size committees. In this paper we are developing three algorithms (two exact and one
heuristic) to compute the efﬁciency for committees with high number of voters within a reason-
able timeframe. Algorithms are applied for evaluating the voting efﬁciency in the Lower House
of the Czech Parliament, in the European Parliament and in the Council of Ministers of the EU.
Keywords Efﬁciency of voting, committee, European Parliament, EU Council of Ministers
JEL classiﬁcation D71, D72 
1. Introduction
While the problem of legitimacy (allocating voting weights to voters) is rather complex
and is handled using different concepts of voting power (see e.g. Felsenthal and Ma-
chover 1998), the problem of efﬁciency is relatively simpler: What is the probability
that a proposal submitted for voting is approved (i.e., the probability of changing the
status quo)? The generally accepted measure of efﬁciency is the so called Coleman
index of the power of a collective to change the status quo (the probability of the ap-
pearance of the winning coalition under the assumption of the equal probability of any
coalition formation), see Coleman (1971). For empirical studies of different alterna-
tive voting rules in the EU Council of Ministers from the standpoint of legitimacy and
efﬁciency see Hosli (2008) and Leech and Aziz (2010).
The main aim of this article is to provide a fast algorithm (running with polyno-
mial time complexity) for the computation of the efﬁciency of voting systems, as well
as some basic analysis of this algorithm. In the context of the European integration
process, the minimum number of voters to be investigated is 30. This number of voters
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is hardly reachable by standard algorithms since the total number of coalitions to be
investigated is 230 = 1;073;741;824.
Voting is a way of transforming many individual preferences into one ﬁnal prefe-
rence. In this paper, I investigate the efﬁciency of basic voting systems, also known as
a simple weighted majority game, i.e. the probability of a proposal to be approved in
a voting process, while the probabilities of rejection are prescribed to each individual
voter. The efﬁciency can be inﬂuenced not only by the preferences and probabilities
of rejection by each voter, but also by the voting system itself, i.e. by the quota and
weights assigned to each individual voter.
In the ﬁrst part I analyze the efﬁciency of the simple voting system based on one
voting rule while the preference of each voter is given by the rejection of any pro-
posal with 0:5 probability and the acceptance of any proposal with 0:5 probability.
This simpliﬁcation can be used for the selection and tuning of the newly introduced
voting systems, where no additional information about the individual preferences are
known. It is straightforward that by giving each voter the same weight in the voting,
the probability of exactly k 2 N out of n 2 N, k < n voters approving the proposal is
driven by the binomial probability distribution. The main aim of this paper is to support
the creators of voting rules (this can be voting rules in Parliament, general meetings
of stockholders as well as in any other organizations, institutions or companies where
voting is employed to make one unique decision as a representation of many individual
preferences) with some basic knowledge of the efﬁciency of voting rules. It is impor-
tant to know which voting system leads to which probability of changing the status quo
(approval of the proposal) under the speciﬁed preferences of the individuals.
Suppose, we have a set N = f1;:::;ng: The cardinality of N is then jNj = n 2 N:
This set will represent the set of voters (voting bodies), so that each voter is represented
by just one index from N: Suppose there is a vector space Vn above the ﬁeld of real
numbers and the set Sn  Vn of all vectors w = (w1;:::;wn); is such that å
n
k=1wk = 1
and for all k = 1;:::;n, wk  0: The set of all real numbers between 0 and 1 (including
both) is denoted L; i.e. L=fl 2 R : 0  l  1g: We call the ordered couples (l;w)2
LSn a committee and the set of all possible committees LSn is denoted Mn: The
vector w from Sn is called a vector of weights and the number l from L is called a
quota. A coalition will be called any set of voters, which are represented by a set of
indices Q  N; so that j 2 Q , voter represented by index j accepts the proposal: In
other words, a coalition is a set of all the voters who accept the proposal. In the formal
deﬁnitions it is quite convenient to use the n-dimensional unit cube representation.
Suppose there is an n-dimensional unit cube and denote the set of all its vertices Cn, i.e.
Cn = f(c1; ;cn) : ci 2 f0;1g;i 2 f1;:::;ngg: The cardinality of Cn is 2n: A proposal
isapprovedifandonlyifthesumoftheweightsofthosevoterswhoaccepttheproposal




wici  l; (1)
where c = (c1;:::;cn) 2 Cn is deﬁned as ci = 0 if the i-th voter rejected the proposal
and ci = 1 if he or she approved it.
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 5, no. 2 173P. Doleˇ zel
Hence a coalition can be given by j 2 Q , cj = 1: Each c 2 Cn represents just
one coalition. The efﬁciency of a committee (l;w) 2 Mn is deﬁned as the ratio of
all the winning coalitions (coalitions that change the status quo) and all the possible













where the I[A] is the identiﬁer of A, i.e. I[A] = 1 if and only if the condition A is true,




2n : k = 1;:::;2n

: (3)
Since the efﬁciency function can only attain a ﬁnite number of values, it attains
its maximum and minimum and it is not continuous. The efﬁciency is invariant to the









Standard algorithms that compute the exact efﬁciency of voting could be used only
for committees with a low number of voters, as they have to check all possible coali-
tions. Computing the efﬁciency of voting is an NP-complete problem, see Matsui and
Matsumi (1999) and Matsui and Matsumi (1998), since adding one more voter approx-
imately doubles the computation time. I have created two algorithms for computing the
exact efﬁciency for general committees. The ﬁrst one is a simple recursive algorithm
(or SRA), the second one is a recursive algorithm with a branch and bound technique
employed (or SRB) so as to omit some of the irrelevant committees, once they are
known, from further computation. The SRA algorithm seems to be faster for quotas
around one half, the SRB algorithm is faster for quotas close to 1 or 0. The reason is
clear. The SRB algorithm is faster due to the branch and bound method, which can
prune some branches of irrelevant solutions when the quota is close to 1 or 0. On the
other hand, the branch and bound technique itself consumes time in verifying the solu-
tion relevance in each recursive step. These veriﬁcations are very time consuming and
can be justiﬁed only by saving time via the pruning. However, for quotas around one
half, the pruning is not sufﬁcient to prevail over the negative impact of checks on the
procedural time.
We can omit computing the exact efﬁciency and try to estimate it. The question is
whether the estimation can be done as precisely as needed in practical applications. In
real life we need to be able to estimate the efﬁciency in percents with reliable certainty.
Estimation error can be controlled in probability. I have created a heuristic algorithm
(or HRA), which gives not an exact, but a sufﬁciently precise solution to the efﬁciency
of a simple weighted voting system for committees with a high number of voters.
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The HRA algorithm is based on simulating coalitions and checking whether they
are winning or not. The number of simulated coalitions will only be a negligible part
of the total number of coalitions. Suppose we deﬁne a random variable Xi as Xi = 0
if and only if the i-th coalition (in the inﬁnite sequence of randomly chosen coalitions
from the set of all coalitions) is losing, and Xi = 1 if and only if it is winning. The
random sequence Xi is i.i.d. as the draws from the set of all coalitions are performed
independently1 and each coalition is generated with the same probability. Then, due to








Xi = EX1; [P] a.s.,
because EjX1j < ¥: We know the average converges to a unique number. In addition,
it can be shown that this number equals the efﬁciency. The remaining question is the




















































and apply it for t = 0:01 as a margin of error. We get the probability of an error that
is greater than or equal to 0.01 (the efﬁciency will be different from the exact one by
at least 0.01), equal to or lower than 2e 0:0002n. When using the HRA algorithm we
perform 50,000 iterations, and so the probability will be at most 0:0000908.
As previously mentioned, the HRA algorithm is based on independent draws (with
repeats) from the set of all possible coalitions and verifying whether they are winning
or not. Each draw is done in two steps. In the ﬁrst step the size of the simulated
coalition is randomly chosen from the binomial distribution of the probability, and in
the second the voters in this coalition are chosen from the set of all voters performing
independent draws from the uniform discrete distribution without repeats (since we do
not want to have one voter in any coalition more than once).
In the ﬁrst step the HRA algorithm has to randomly generate the size of the coali-
tion from the binomial distribution. This procedure has proven to be the most time
consuming part of the whole process of efﬁciency estimation, namely because of the
very large numbers of voters, since the binomial distribution requires computing the
binomial coefﬁcients. The higher the number of voters, the higher the factorial that
1 In each step of the simulation some coalitions are generated independently of the previously generated
coalitions and hence each coalition can appear more than once in the generated sequence of coalitions.












Figure 1. Deviances of simulated efﬁciencies from their average (100 trials)
needs to be computed. If it were really necessary, we could have not utilized the al-
gorithm for very big committees as it would become time consuming to compute the
















where F is the distribution function of the Fisher-Snedecor probability distribution, see
Andˇ el (2004).
The HRA algorithm uses the equality (6) to simulate the size of the coalitions from
binomial distribution and thus huge committees can be analyzed.
I have tested the performance of the HRA algorithm and it works well in terms of
processing time: It always runs 50,000 iterations, no matter the number of voters, and
so it has a constant time complexity. Some simple results showing the variability of the
estimations are shown in the following images: In Figure 1, there are 100 estimations
of the efﬁciencies of a simple weighted voting system with 35 voters (with the given
distribution of weights and a quota of 0.6; the exact values are not important for now).
In this ﬁgure, the deviance of each observation from their average is shown.
In Figure 2 the histogram of the estimated efﬁciencies is shown.
In Table 1, some results of the heuristic algorithm for speciﬁed committees are
shown.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.043372 0.044116 0.04486 0.045604 0.046348         0.047092
Figure 2. Histogram of simulated efﬁciencies
3. Efﬁciency analysis
Lemma 1. The maximum efﬁciency for a quota higher than 1
2 is 1
2 for any committee
size n  2.
Proof. Assume n  2. The efﬁciency of 1
2 is certainly attained for any quota
higher than 1








A . When å
n




i=1wi(1 ci) < l and å
n
i=1wi(1 ci) is surely not a winning coalition. So for each
winning coalition there is at least one losing coalition and so the efﬁciency can not
exceed 1
2: 
As we show in Lemma 1, no efﬁciency for a quota above 1
2 can be above 1
2, and
so we would change any heuristic estimate of the efﬁciency that is higher than the
attainable maximum to 1
2:




































 element coalitions and all coali-
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For odd n (7) equals 1










Lemma 3. Suppose n 2 N, n > 1; l > 1























Proof. The coalitions that are winning are all dnle element coalitions as well as all






























From this simple analysis, we know how to ﬁnd the weights maximizing the efﬁ-
ciency, when the quota is greater or equal to 1
2.
The set of rules, which have to be fulﬁlled in order to approve a proposal, can be
larger than just one-element sets. The multi-rule voting system is a system where more
than one set of weights is assigned to the voters and more than one quota is employed.
The proposal is approved only if accepted by all members of a coalition which is a
winning coalition under each of the single rules. These systems are closely studied in
Leech et al. (2007). Up to now, we have studied only one-rule systems represented by
(1) and here we deﬁne multi-rule systems analogously.
Amulti-ruleweightedvotingsystemisasysteminwhicheachproposalisapproved









where c = (c1;:::;cn) 2 Cn is deﬁned as ci = 0 if the i-th voter rejected the proposal
and ci = 1 if he approved it.
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where wi = (wi1;:::;win), å
n
j=1wij = 1 for all i = 1;:::;m and wij  0 for all i =
1;:::;m and all j = 1;:::;n, is deﬁned as the number of all winning coalitions divided














where the I[A] is the identiﬁer of A, i.e. I[A] = 1 if and only if the condition A is true,
I[A] = 0 otherwise.
While in the case of the one-rule voting system there is only one round of testing
for which coalition is winning, in the multi-rule case once we have found the set of
coalitions which are winning under the ﬁrst rule, we continue with this set through to
the second rule, third rule and so on. In other words, it is not a problem that would be
more complex in terms of time complexity than the one-rule voting system.
The efﬁciency deﬁned in (11) can only attain values from a ﬁnite set. It attains
its maximum and minimum and it is not continuous. I have enabled the algorithms
SRA, SRB and HRA to treat the multi-rule voting systems simply by making them
verify more than just one rule when verifying whether a given coalition is winning. I
applied the HRA algorithm to compute the efﬁciencies of the qualiﬁed majority voting
process of the Council of Ministers of the EU (a good example of the multi-rule voting
procedure) under the Treaty of Nice and under the Lisbon Treaty. I also brieﬂy analyze
some of the rules separately and their contribution to the total efﬁciency. This approach
shows the level of redundancy of the particular rules.
4. Applications
4.1 Czech Lower House of the Parliament in 2006
The Czech Parliamentary voting system used for the Lower House of the Parliament
is based on the law Z´ akon 247/1995 Sb., O volb´ ach do Parlamentu ˇ Cesk´ e republiky a
o zmˇ enˇ e a doplnˇ en´ ı nˇ ekter´ ych dalˇ s´ ıch z´ akon˚ u (1995). It is a two-stage voting system.
In the ﬁrst stage, mandates are allocated to regional districts deﬁned by the law using
a combination of Hagenbach-Bischoff’s quota and the method of maximal reminder.
Then the limit of 5% is applied to reject all the parties which do not have over 5% of
all the valid votes at the national level from further allocation. In the second stage the
d’Hondt method is used to assign mandates to the parties which have not been rejected.
The second stage is performed in each district separately. There are 200 mandates in
the Lower House of the Parliament.
The regular approval process is based on the majority rule.2 This corresponds to
a committee with a quota equal to q = 101=200 and weights equal to the shares of
mandates assigned to each party in the elections.3 For the constitutional proposals
2 We only analyze the absolute majority rule since the simple majority can be represented by many commit-
tees with different weights according to how many members of each party are momentarily absent.
3 This committee is based on the assumption that each member voting is always the same as all the other
members of the same party.
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approval process the quota is different q = 3=5:
First we compute the efﬁciency of the absolute majority committee resulting in the
2006 Parliamentary elections and we look at how different the political division of the
Lower House of the Parliament would have to be in order to increase the efﬁciency to
its maximum. Then we compute the efﬁciency for the constitutional approval process.
Table 2. The results of the 2006 Parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic
Party (name in 2006) Votes (in %) Deputies
ODS 35:38% 81
ˇ CSSD 32:32% 74
KSˇ CM 12:81% 26
KDU-ˇ CSL 7:22% 13
Strana zelen´ ych 6:29% 6
The results of the 2006 Czech Parliamentary elections are shown in the Table 2.
The efﬁciency of the absolute majority committee given by the results of 2006 elec-
tions equals 0:46875. This result can be obtained via the SRA or SRB algorithms
since the number of parties is low. We know from the Lemma 1 that the maximum
possible efﬁciency for quotas above 1=2 equals 1=2: Hence we search for the clos-
est vector of weights with the efﬁciency 1=2: The resulting set of weights for the
quota 101=200 (corresponding to the set of parties (ODS, ˇ CSSD, KSˇ CM, KDU-ˇ CSL,
SZ) is (0:40285;0:3689;0:1361;0:06305;0:0291) compared to the observed vector of
weights given to the parties in the 2006 elections (0:405;0:37;0:13;0:065;0:03). The
result is somewhat surprising because it is clearly not that far from the actual set of
weights (the distance in L2-norm equals 0:00690326; which is about 0:8% of the max-
imal distance in L2-norm for 5-member voting systems). The numbers of deputies
assigned to each party would have to be modiﬁed very little in order to achieve the
maximal efﬁciency from (81;74;26;13;6) to (80;74;27;13;6): Regardless, we have
to keep in mind that this analysis is purely theoretical and neglects the political posi-
tions of each of the parties.
In the case of a constitutional majority with a quota equal to 3=5 the efﬁciency is
0:25.
4.2 The European Parliament in 2009
At the end of 2009 there were 736 members representing 27 EU countries in the EU
Parliament, which was governed by the Maastricht Treaty. The numbers of mandates
assigned to each country are shown in the Table 3 and follows the degressive propor-
tionality principle. Assume we want to revise the weights assigned to each particular
country in order to increase the efﬁciency. To do this we have to take into account the
proposals for which all the countries are voting homogeneously.4
We assume they follow the procedure of absolute majority voting. The efﬁciency of
voting in the European Parliament for an absolute majority voting procedure under the
4 For most of the real proposals in the EU Parliament voting about proposals is based on political viewpoints
rather than nationality.
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Table 3. Portions and numbers of mandates assigned to each country in the European Parliament
via the Maastricht Treaty
Country Weight (in %) Members Country Weight (in %) Members
Germany 13:5% 99 France 9:8% 72
Italy 9:8% 72 Belgium 3:0% 22
Netherlands 3:4% 25 Luxembourg 0:8% 6
Great Britain 9:8% 72 Denmark 1:8% 13
Ireland 1:6% 12 Greece 3:0% 22
Spain 6:8% 50 Portugal 3:0% 22
Sweden 2:5% 18 Austria 2:3% 17
Finland 1:8% 13 Poland 6:8% 50
Czech Republic 2:7% 22 Hungary 2:7% 22
Slovakia 1:8% 13 Slovenia 1:0% 7
Latvia 1:1% 8 Lithuania 1:6% 12
Cyprus 0:8% 6 Estonia 0:8% 6
Malta 0:7% 5 Romania 4:5% 33
Bulgaria 2:3% 17
assumption of the probability of acceptance equal to 0:5 is 0:49798815: This is very
close to the maximal possible efﬁciency, which is 0:5: Therefore, there is no practical
need to change the weights to achieve a higher a priori efﬁciency of the committee un-
der the assumption of a country-homogeneous proposal. The efﬁciencies computed for
the European Parliament absolute majority voting system work under the assumption
of country-homogeneous voting as shown in Table 4.
Table 4. The efﬁciency of the absolute majority of the 2009 European Parliament given the
probabilities of acceptance and country-homogeneous voting
p 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
e 0% 0% 0:004% 0:104% 0:532%
p 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
e 1:974% 5:422% 12:130% 21:822% 35:188%
p 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
e 49:8500% 64:564% 77:534% 88:162% 94:348%
p 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
e 97:888% 99:368% 99:872% 99:998% 100:000%
At the end of 2009 in the European Parliament there were 6 political groups, in
which 709 members were organized, and 27 independent members not belonging to
anyofthese6groups. ThegroupsarelistedinTable5, wheretheindependentmembers
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Table 5. The political structure of the European Parliament as of the end of 2009
EPPD (Conservative/Christian Democrat) 265
ECR (Conservatives only) 54






Table 6. The efﬁciency of the absolute majority of the 2009 European Parliament given the
probabilities of acceptance and party-homogeneous voting
p 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
e 0% 0:308% 1:524% 3:532% 6:762%
p 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
e 10:936% 16:824% 23:282% 31:548% 39:708%
p 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
e 49:800% 59:392% 68:220% 76:342% 82:952%
p 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
e 89:074% 93:332% 96:400% 98:536% 99:676%
are assigned to a group of Independents. However, each member of the Independents
is treated as one single political party for the efﬁciency computation.
When we assume the absolute majority procedure and only consider the proposals
for which the voting is party-homogeneous (all members within one political group
vote the same way), we end up with a different committee. I have analyzed the efﬁ-
ciencies of this voting system for different probabilities of acceptance. The results are
shown in Table 6.
When we look at the graph in Figure 3, we can conclude:
(i) When the proposal is in the category of country-homogeneous proposals (each
country votes as one individual), the probability it will be approved is higher
than that of a proposal from the category of party-homogeneous proposals, but
only for probabilities of acceptance higher than approximately one half.
(ii) When the proposal is in the category of country-homogeneous proposals (each
country votes as one individual), the probability it will be approved is lower than
that of a proposal from the category of party-homogeneous proposals, but only
for probabilities of acceptance lower than approximately one half.
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Figure 3. The efﬁciency with respect to the probability of acceptance within the 2009 European
Parliament absolute majority procedure
4.3 The Council of Ministers of the EU in 2009
In this part, I study the efﬁciency of qualiﬁed majority voting in the Council of Min-
isters of the EU under the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon. The Council of
Ministers of the EU has 27 Members States. Their weights in the qualiﬁed majority
voting rule and the most recent available population estimation of each of the Member
States are shown in Table 7.
The multi-rule voting system applied to most of the proposals that are subject to
voting in The Council of Ministers of the EU under the Treaty of Nice is the qualiﬁed
majority voting, which is given by the following three rules:
(i) The sum of the weights of the approving states has to be at least 255 out of 345
to accept a proposal.
(ii) The number of the approving states has to be at least 14 out of 27 to accept a
proposal.
(iii) The population of the approving states has to make up at least 62% of the total
population of the EU to accept a proposal.
The efﬁciency estimation (given the probability of acceptance is 0:5 for all members)
of the qualiﬁed majority multi-rule voting system in The Council of Ministers of the
EU under the Treaty of Nice equals approximately 1:9%. The estimated efﬁciencies
(probabilities of approving a proposal) for the different probabilities of acceptance of
a single voter are shown in the Table 8 and Figure 5.
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Table 7. The population and weights assigned to states in qualiﬁed majority voting in the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the EU via the Treaty of Nice
State Weight Population (mil.) State Weight Population (mil.)
Germany 29 82.3 Italy 29 59.7
France 29 64.5 United Kingdom 29 61.0
Spain 27 45.2 Poland 27 38.1
Romania 14 22.3 The Netherlands 13 16.4
Belgium 12 10.6 Czech Republic 12 10.4
Greece 12 11.2 Hungary 12 10.0
Portugal 12 10.6 Austria 10 8.3
Sweden 10 9.2 Bulgaria 10 7.7
Denmark 7 5.5 Denmark 7 5.5
Ireland 7 4.4 Lithuania 7 3.4
Slovakia 7 5.4 Finland 7 5.3
Cyprus 4 0.8 Estonia 4 1.4
Latvia 4 2.3 Luxembourg 4 0.5
Slovenia 4 2.0 Malta 3 0.4
Table 8. The efﬁciency of the qualiﬁed majority via the Treaty of Nice for the given probabilities
of acceptance
p 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
e 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
p 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
e 0:0005% 0:0075% 0:034% 0:173% 0:600%
p 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
e 1:984% 5:288% 11:587% 22:520% 38:089%
p 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
e 56:9167% 75:4645% 89:856% 97:452% 99:828%
We know, the total number of coalitions equals 227 = 134;217;728: In Table 9
and in Figure 4, the efﬁciencies for the modiﬁed qualiﬁed majority of The Council of
Ministers of the EU under the Treaty of Nice are shown. There are two modiﬁcations:
The ﬁrst one leaves out the rule of population (denoted e1) and the second leaves out
the rule of artiﬁcial weights (denoted e2).
As can be seen in the graph, the impact of the rule of population in the qualiﬁed
majority voting under the Treaty of Nice is almost redundant. The only reason for it
to be applied is for protection against a radical change in the population distribution
among member states. Interestingly, leaving out the rule of artiﬁcial weights would
signiﬁcantly increase the probability of acceptance. On the other hand, this would
mean overwhelming the small states. This result seems to be quite intuitive since the
concept of fairness and the concept of efﬁciency are often in contradiction.
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Table 9. The impact of distinct rules on the efﬁciency of the qualiﬁed majority via the Treaty of
Nice for the given probabilities of acceptance
p 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
e1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
e2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0:006%
p 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
e1 0% 0:008% 0:038% 0:170% 0:696%
e2 0:038% 0:358% 1:460% 4:386% 10:272%
p 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
e1 1:970% 5:162% 11:700% 22:324% 37:918%
e2 18:804% 31:156% 44:764% 59:068% 71:582%
p 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
e1 56:736% 75:772% 89:9313% 97:456% 99:856%























































Figure 4. The impact of the distinct rules on efﬁciency within the procedure of the qualiﬁed
majority via the Treaty of Nice
Under the Lisbon Treaty the procedure of the qualiﬁed majority can be simpliﬁed
to just two rules:
(i) At least 55% of all the states have to accept the proposal.
(ii) The population of the approving states has to make up at least 65% of the total
population of the EU to accept a proposal.
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The efﬁciency estimation (given that the probability of acceptance is 0:5 for all
members) of the qualiﬁed majority multi-rule voting system in The Council of Min-
isters of the EU under the Lisbon Treaty equals approximately 12:7%: The estimated
efﬁciencies (probabilities of approving a proposal) for the different probabilities of the
acceptance of a single voter are shown in the Table 10 and Figure 5.
Table 10. The efﬁciency of the qualiﬁed majority via the Treaty of Lisbon for the given proba-
bilities of acceptance
p 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
e 0% 0% 0% 0% 0:002%
p 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
e 0:030% 0:128% 0:676% 2:296% 6:090%
p 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
e 12:664% 23:326% 36:248% 50:034% 64:262%
p 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
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Figure 5. The efﬁciency with respect to probability of acceptance within the procedure of qual-
iﬁed majority via the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty
In the Table 11 and Figure 6, the efﬁciencies for the modiﬁed qualiﬁed majority
of The Council of Ministers of the EU under the Lisbon Treaty are shown. There are
two modiﬁcations: The ﬁrst one leaves out the rule of population (denoted e1) and the
second one leaves out the rule of the number of states (denoted e2).
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Table 11. The impact of distinct rules on the efﬁciency of the qualiﬁed majority via the Lisbon
Treaty for the given probabilities of acceptance
p 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
e1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0:004%
e2 0% 0% 0% 0:028% 0:096%
p 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
e1 0:074% 0:422% 2:324% 7:458% 18:138%
e2 0:336% 1:060% 2:514% 5:250% 10:198%
p 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
e1 34:982% 55:706% 75:146% 88:650% 96:442%
e2 16:876% 26:764% 38:508% 51:716% 65:286%
p 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
e1 99:274% 99:908% 99:998% 100:000% 100:000%
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Figure 6. The impact of the distinct rules on efﬁciency within the procedure of a qualiﬁed ma-
jority via the Lisbon Treaty
As can be seen in the graph, the impact of the rule of the number of states in the
qualiﬁed majority voting under the Lisbon Treaty is almost redundant. On the other
hand leaving out the population rule would signiﬁcantly increase the probability of
acceptance.
If we compare the qualiﬁed majority under the Treaty of Nice and under the Lisbon
Treaty, we end up with an expected result of a signiﬁcantly higher efﬁciency under the
Lisbon Treaty since the smaller states lose part of their ability to block proposals.
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5. Conclusion
I have provided two exact and one heuristic algorithm for efﬁciency computation and
some basic theoretical analysis of the efﬁciency function as a function of quota and
weights, focusing mainly on studying the quota and deriving some characteristics of
this function with respect to the quota. Then I applied this knowledge to some practical
problems. At ﬁrst ﬁnding how far is the outcome of the 2006 Parliamentary elections
for the Czech Lower House of the Parliament from an outcome that would represent
a vector of weights for which the maximal efﬁciency would be attained. I have found
out that the situation in 2009 in the Czech Lower House of the Parliament was very
close to what would represent a maximal a priori efﬁciency (as deﬁned in the article)
for the approval of ordinary proposals and the outcome is relatively far from the ma-
ximum a priori efﬁciency for the approval of constitutional proposals. The quota for
constitutional proposal approval seems to be sufﬁcient as a constitution safety guaran-
tee because the closest vector of weights that represents a maximal a priori efﬁciency
is only for two parties being elected to the Lower House of the Parliament, each with
the weight 0.5.
Then I computed the efﬁciency of the voting system of the former European Parlia-
ment, assuming the simple majority quota for both country and political dimensions.
Finally the heuristic algorithm was used for comparing the efﬁciency of voting under
the qualiﬁed majority rule in the Council of Ministers of the EU under the Treaty of
Nice and the Lisbon Treaty. Then each of these two procedures were analyzed sep-
arately to verify the distinct rules and their impact on the ﬁnal efﬁciency. We could
see the population rule in the qualiﬁed majority under the Treaty of Nice is redundant.
However the most inﬂuential rule of artiﬁcially assigned weights to each state was
abandoned in the procedure under the Lisbon Treaty and hence the efﬁciency of the
voting increased signiﬁcantly.
The developed heuristic algorithm generally runs at a constant time no matter the
number of voters, but with a limited preciseness. It can be used, with slight changes,
for estimations of most of the power indices. The generalized power indices (see
Aleskerov 2006) would require deeper changes.
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